Contested space: Eastern Europe between Russia and the EU

By Ian Bond

★ A quarter of a century after the Soviet Union collapsed, the states that emerged from it are dogged by its legacy. Their relations with Russia, the EU and in some cases each other are unstable and sometimes hostile.

★ The six states participating in the EU’s Eastern Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) find themselves between a wary EU that would like to see them prosper but is not prepared to embrace them as fully European, and an assertive Russia that wants to keep them within its sphere of influence at all costs.

★ These countries have developed in very different ways, both domestically and in their relations with Russia and the West. For most of them, the West is now a more important economic partner than Russia. But politically, some aspire to get closer to the West, some look to Russia, and Azerbaijan keeps its distance from both.

★ The EU and Russia have both soft and hard power instruments available to influence the direction of travel of the six. Yet both have often used their power in ways that have undermined their influence. Neither the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) nor the EU’s Eastern Partnership can point to great success.

★ Russia has targeted large Russian-speaking populations in Eastern Partnership states with propaganda designed to turn them against Western institutions. But its willingness to use economic and military power against its neighbours has often alienated those who might otherwise align themselves with Russia rather than the EU culturally or economically.

★ Russia’s fear, however ill-founded, that Eastern Partnership countries would fall into the Western orbit has led it to rely on various methods of coercion to prevent that happening. Russian troops occupy parts of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and are stationed (with the concurrence of the host states) in Armenia and Belarus. Russia has used economic sanctions for political purposes against Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

★ On the EU side, the Eastern Partnership remains a programme without a clear objective. While the EU regarded the countries of Central Europe, and the Baltic States, as fully European and therefore eligible to join the Union, there has never been consensus on whether any of the former Soviet states should be given a perspective of membership (however distant and hedged with conditions).

★ The result is that the association agreements negotiated with the most pro-EU countries (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) have been treated as technocratic exercises, devoid of political implications. And the EU has sometimes seemed willing to turn a blind eye to corrupt practices by politicians who call themselves pro-European. Populations that wanted their countries to integrate more closely with the EU have become disillusioned.
At the same time, the West has made things worse by promising Georgia and Ukraine NATO membership without ever intending to make good on its promise. In so doing the West has provided Russia with a pretext for destabilising both countries, but has not been willing to defend them.

The election of Donald Trump as American president, and the prospect of Britain leaving the EU, are likely to exacerbate the problems of this ‘grey area’ in Europe. Even the remote possibility of membership of Western organisations for former Soviet states is likely to vanish. And Trump's infatuation with President Putin could lead him to concede Eastern Europe as a Russian sphere of influence.

If Eastern European countries are unlikely to join Western institutions for the foreseeable future, and do not want to join Russian ones, what can they do? They need to work on increasing their internal resilience, rather than hoping that the West will save them.

To do that, their top priorities should be to establish the rule of law; ensure that minority ethnic groups are fairly treated and have a stake in society; and try to maintain good political and trade relationships with Russia, while ensuring that these relations are based on sovereign equality and mutual advantage. And they should strengthen their links with other major powers, including China, in order to increase the number of countries with a stake in their sovereignty and stability.

For the West, the challenge is to balance the theoretical right of the Eastern Partnership countries to aspire to join the EU and NATO with the practical reality that they are far from meeting the conditions for membership, and the political reality that the West has no desire to confront Russia over them. The West should use the coming years to persuade Moscow that, whether or not these countries ultimately join Western institutions, it is in everyone’s interests that they should be prosperous, stable and well-governed.

For Russia, the challenge is to see its neighbours in a different light, as sovereign states that are potential partners, not as a threat that can only be countered by weakening them.

Map 1: Eastern partners and Eurasian economic union members
The Soviet Union officially ceased to exist on December 26th 1991, but by then all 15 of its constituent republics had already declared their independence. This paper focuses on the six countries which belong to the EU’s Eastern Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). These six have had the most turbulent times of any of the post-Soviet states since independence. They have endured varying degrees of internal instability, including civil wars and separatist insurgencies. Only Belarus has made it through the last quarter century without being involved in armed conflict.

Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a war between 1991 and 1994 over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, an area inhabited largely by ethnic Armenians. When a ceasefire came into force in 1994, Armenia occupied almost all of Nagorno-Karabakh, and about 9 per cent of Azerbaijani territory outside the enclave. The conflict has never been resolved, and skirmishing continues sporadically along the line of contact: an outbreak of fighting in April 2016 claimed around 30 lives. Armenia has the external trappings of democracy (though one president was forced out of office in 1998, his successors have been elected and have observed term limits). But the American NGO ‘Freedom House’ now classifies it as a “semi-consolidated authoritarian regime”, with a single party and its economic allies dominating the state.1 Since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict it has relied on Russian protection for its security against Azerbaijan and Turkey; but a large diaspora also gives Armenia strong ties to the United States and France, where many Armenians fled after the 1915-17 genocide carried out by the Ottoman Empire.

After a succession of short-lived presidencies in its early years of independence, Azerbaijan has become a hereditary dictatorship: Heydar Aliyev, a former member of the Soviet politburo, took power in 1993 and was succeeded in 2003 by his son Ilham Aliyev. As a petro-state in which major Western oil companies have invested heavily, Azerbaijan has been subject to less human rights criticism than other comparable former Soviet states, and has largely been able to ignore it. It has shown no interest in joining the EU or NATO, and has also managed to avoid being drawn into Russia’s orbit.

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Belarus has been called ‘the last dictatorship in Europe’ (though sadly it faces increasing competition for the title). Its president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, has been in office since 1994. For most of his time in power, Lukashenko has prioritised relations with Russia over those with the EU, both because Russia makes no demands on him to improve human rights and political freedoms, and also because he depends on Russia economically, not least for subsidised energy supplies. Lukashenko has never wanted to become an appendage of Russia, however, so from time to time he has warmed up relations with the EU, to remind Moscow that he has other options. Since Russia's intervention in Ukraine in 2014, Lukashenko has once again been trying to get closer to the EU; and the Union has rewarded him by lifting long-standing sanctions which it imposed for various human rights violations.

Georgia suffered more trauma than most former Soviet states in its early years of independence. Its first post-independence president was bloodily deposed, leading to a civil war; his successor, the former Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze, was removed from office in a peaceful revolution in 2003. Russian-backed separatists effectively took control of the autonomous regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 1993. Russia provoked Shevardnadze's successor, the pro-Western President Mikheil Saakashvili into an ill-fated attempt to regain control of South Ossetia in August 2008, then invaded Georgia and subsequently recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states, maintaining substantial forces in both regions. Since then, the Georgian political scene has become calmer; Saakashvili left power at the end of his second term of office in 2013, and there was a peaceful transfer of power to the opposition. All the main parties in Georgia support a pro-Western course.
Moldova, by contrast, remains unstable. Its predecessor, Soviet Moldavia, consisted of territory west of the River Nistru (or Dniestr) taken from Romania in 1940, and territory east of the river which had been part of Ukraine. As the Soviet Union was disintegrating, the east bank (where a Soviet army was stationed), fearing that Moldova would reunite with Romania, broke away to form the ‘Prednestrovian Moldavian Republic’ or Transnistria; Russian forces are still there, ostensibly as peacekeepers. Moldova itself has oscillated between a presidential and a parliamentary system, and between pro-Western and pro-Moscow governments. Relations with Romania are close, and many Moldovans have taken Romanian citizenship and emigrated to the EU. Several short-lived pro-European governments have held office since 2009, and in 2014 Moldova signed an association agreement with the EU; but in December 2016 voters elected a pro-Russian president, Igor Dodon, who wants to scrap the agreement. Moldova declared itself neutral at the time of independence, and has stuck to that (though it participates in NATO’s Partnership for Peace).

Ukraine, the largest by far of the Eastern European states (and the second most populous of the post-Soviet states, after Russia) has also gone through periods of instability since independence. There was a peaceful transfer of power from its first president, Leonid Kravchuk, to its second, Leonid Kuchma. But when Kuchma’s prime minister, Viktor Yanukovych, tried to succeed him in 2004 with Russian backing, an election rigging scandal led to the Orange Revolution and the election of the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko. Yushchenko and his allies governed so ineffectively that Yanukovych was elected as president in 2010. Yanukovych claimed to be in favour of EU membership (though against NATO membership), but when he changed course in 2013, rejected an association agreement with the EU and then cracked down on pro-EU demonstrators in Kyiv in 2014, he was deposed. He was replaced by the wealthy businessman Petro Poroshenko, who reverted to a pro-Western policy but had to contend with Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine.

This paper examines the troubled relationship between the EU’s six Eastern Partnership countries, Russia and the West. It will look at how Moscow and Brussels regard them, and at how, with the right policies on all sides, they could become part of a zone of co-operation rather than geopolitical rivalry.
Essentially, the six states are caught in a contested space, between Russia and the West. Neither side regards them as fully European, like the Baltic countries; nor as non-European, like the Central Asian states. Both sides have created structures for regional co-operation in which the six can participate. In most of the states the main political cleavage is between those who favour integration with Western organisations, and those who favour links with other post-Soviet states. But Russia regards them as part of its ‘near abroad’ or ‘Eurasia’; terms it uses only of former Soviet states, not of other countries that share a border with Russia. And the former Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, claimed the “countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbours” as Russia’s region of “privileged interests”.²

It is perfectly logical that the areas nearest to Russia’s borders should be a priority for Moscow, as the EU’s neighbourhood is for Brussels. But the EU and Russia talk about these regions in very different ways. The EU’s 2015 review of the European Neighbourhood Policy acknowledges the bad state of relations with Russia following its annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of eastern Ukraine, but still hopes that Russia could be a useful partner “when conditions allow”³.

“Putin made clear that he saw the customs union and the Eurasian Economic Union as geopolitical tools.”

Russia’s 2015 National Security Strategy, on the other hand, sees the involvement of the West in Eurasia in more adversarial terms: “The West’s stance, directed at opposing integration processes and creating seats of tension in the Eurasian region, exerts a negative influence on the achievement of Russian national interests”:⁴ Russia’s 2016 foreign policy concept (the foreign ministry’s guiding document, endorsed by Putin) reinforces the impression that Russia sees the former Soviet states as places where it has “privileged interests”: the concept states that “While respecting the right of its partners within the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] to establish relations with other international actors, Russia expects the CIS member-states to fully implement their obligations within integration structures that include Russia, as well as further promote integration and mutually beneficial co-operation in the CIS space”.⁵

The CIS is the most comprehensive of the (largely Russian-inspired) international organisations that were established after the break-up of the Soviet Union, initially to manage a smooth transition from a monolithic state to a collection of independent countries that nonetheless had to deal with shared economic and security issues. Of the Eastern Partnership countries, only Georgia is not a member of the CIS (it pulled out after Russia’s 2008 invasion of its territory). Ukraine (which did not ratify the CIS founding charter of 1993, but participated in the organisation as a de facto full member) continues to be represented at some CIS meetings, though it has reduced its involvement since the annexation of Crimea. Though the practical importance of the CIS has declined over the last 25 years, most of its members (including Ukraine) signed up to a CIS free trade agreement in 2011. This removed tariffs on almost all goods, froze export duties and attempted to remove non-tariff barriers to trade.⁶ In practice, however, Russia continued to restrict trade with its partners for political reasons; even its closest ally, Belarus, was a victim in 2014.

As it has become frustrated with the failure of the CIS to become an effective international organisation, Russia has focused instead on building up the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which now includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia itself as full members. The first component of the EAEU was a Eurasian customs union, initially consisting of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, which began functioning in 2011. The EAEU itself began operations in 2015. It is broadly modelled on the European Union in terms of its structures. It has a commission, based in Moscow, a court, based in Minsk, a supreme economic council, made up of the presidents of the member-states, and an inter-governmental council, consisting of the prime ministers – though so far no parliament.

Russia would like other states to join the EAEU, and particularly larger and more prosperous ones. This is partly for practical reasons: the EAEU has little scope to increase trade between its members as long as it is economically and demographically dominated by Russia, which accounts for 80 per cent of the EAEU’s population and 83 per cent of its GDP. Had it joined the customs union and subsequently the EAEU, Ukraine would have been a more valuable member than any of the current participants. There is (or was) more pre-existing integration between industries in Russia and Ukraine (especially in the defence sector) than between Russia and the other states. In 2013, the last year of relatively

2: ‘Interview given by Dmitry Medvedev to Television Channels, Channel One, Rossiya, NTV’, Kremlin website, August 31st 2008.
6: ‘Dogovor o zone svobodnoy torgovli SNG’ (Treaty on a CIS zone of free trade (Russian)), RIA Novosty, December 16th 2015.
normal relations between Russia and Ukraine, total trade between the two, at over $24 billion, was worth more than half as much as Russia’s trade with the four countries that now make up the EAEU. Consequently, Russia lent on Ukraine to join its former Soviet neighbours. (One should not over-estimate the economic significance to Russia of trade with Ukraine, however: trade between the EU and Russia in 2013 was worth over $400 billion.)

The problem for Ukraine was that joining the customs union and the EAEU would have forced it to abandon the association agreement and free trade agreement (DCFTA), which it had negotiated with the EU. It was perfectly possible for Ukraine to remain in the CIS FTA and have an association agreement. But it could not have autonomous free trade agreements and simultaneously be a member of the Eurasian customs union.

As then-President Viktor Yanukovych hesitated and tried to find a way to keep both Brussels and Moscow happy in the summer of 2013, Russia imposed trade sanctions on Ukraine, even though they were theoretically outlawed by the CIS FTA. It also offered financial incentives, in the form of a loan to Ukraine at a time when the economy was in trouble and international financial institutions would have imposed more conditions. Yanukovych was persuaded to switch his alignment from Brussels to Moscow. Putin thus made clear that he saw the customs union and the Eurasian Economic Union as geopolitical tools for consolidating a bloc of former Soviet states around Russia, not as purely economic arrangements to benefit their member-states.

Ukraine was not the only country in his sights: Armenia, which like Ukraine (and Georgia and Moldova) had been in the process of negotiating an association agreement with the EU, abruptly changed course and announced in September 2013 that it would join the customs union. Dependent on Russia for its security, Armenia took the hint about the risks of changing its foreign policy orientation after Russia began to deliver arms to Azerbaijan in spring 2013, and Putin visited Baku in August 2013 together with the Russian defence minister, Sergei Shoigu.

But the customs union and the Eurasian Economic Union have yet to deliver significant benefits for their members. The disparity in economic weight between Russia and the other members of the EAEU means that the state of Russia’s economy has a decisive impact on the other members. After the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, Russia’s growth rate initially recovered, reaching a healthy 4.5 per cent in 2010. But thereafter it declined. The Russian economy shrank by 3.7 per cent in 2015, and by a further 0.6 per cent in 2016 (see chart 1).

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**Chart 1:**
Russia: GDP growth rate 2010-16

**Source:**
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2016.
The countries with which Russia was negotiating to create the EAEU were not protected from its economic problems: remittances to them from Russia fell by around 30 per cent between 2013 and 2015. Trade between the members of the customs union declined by 40 per cent in 2012-2016 (see chart 2). At the same time, there are advantages to belonging to the EAEU. In particular, its members get subsidised supplies of Russian oil and gas, and the free movement of labour within the EAEU is vital for poorer members like Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.

As Russia’s economy has contracted, its trade with the members of the Eastern Partnership has fallen in parallel with its trade with EAEU partners. The EU is a more important economic partner than Russia for all the Eastern Partnership countries except Belarus (see charts 3a to 3f). But the EU’s performance was no better than Russia’s: from a high point in 2011, EU trade with Eastern Partnership countries fell each year till 2015 (the last year for which figures are available), a cumulative decline of 42 per cent. It is too early to say whether the entry into
force of deep and comprehensive free trade agreements between the EU and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine will turn this trend around; but so far it seems that neither Russia nor the EU has been able to create an economic miracle in Eastern Europe. There has been a lot of trade integration between the EU-15 and the countries in Central Europe that joined the EU after 2004, despite the weak growth of the EU-15; but so far that trade integration has not reached the Eastern partners.

**Chart 3b:**
Azerbaijani trade with the EU and Russia


**Chart 3c:**
Belarusian trade with the EU and Russia

Chart 3d: Georgian trade with the EU and Russia


Chart 3e: Moldovan trade with the EU and Russia

Russia: Crushing soft power with hard power

Apart from economic levers, Russia starts with important soft power advantages in the Eastern Partnership countries, yet the way in which it uses them (or fails to use them) has reduced its attractiveness. Support for membership of the EAEU in Armenia has declined every year from a high of 67 per cent in 2013 to 46 per cent in 2016, and belief that there will be further convergence between former Soviet states in the next five years has fallen from 32 per cent to 14 per cent.7

Russia would like to make the shared Soviet past a soft power asset. The problem has been finding a narrative that works as a mobilising factor domestically without alienating potential partners in neighbouring countries. The Soviet Union’s victory in ‘the Great Patriotic War’ (the Second World War from the time of Germany’s attack on the USSR in 1941) has become an increasingly central part of the ‘founding myth’ of the Russian Federation. It is an example of a nation prevailing through common sacrifice, and so is useful in encouraging the population to look beyond today’s economic hardship. It enables Russia to claim moral authority over other nations in Europe because of the scale of casualties suffered by the Soviet Union. And it harks back to a time when all the peoples of the Soviet Union were working towards a common goal.

For other countries, however, focusing on the Soviet victory in 1945 implies glossing over what came before and after it. Belarus and Ukraine had both suffered under Soviet rule in the pre-war period. The Soviet secret police murdered between 30,000 and 250,000 people in Belarus between 1937 and 1941. The ‘Holodomor’ (death by starvation) inflicted on Ukrainian peasants during Stalin’s collectivisation of agriculture in 1932-33 killed an estimated 3.3 million people. And these areas of the Soviet Union, not Russia, also suffered proportionately the heaviest casualties in the war, particularly among the civilian population. Between military and civilian casualties, Belarus lost more than 25 per cent of its pre-war population. Moreover, Stalin’s brutal treatment of whole populations suspected of collaborating with the Nazis has left deep historical scars: the Crimean Tatars, for example, were deported to Central Asia in 1944, and they (or their descendants) were only able to return to Crimea in the late 1980s.

Despite differing historical memories of the Second World War, Russia could have made more effective use of the shared pride that the generation of ex-Soviet citizens had in the contribution that all the former Soviet states had made to the victory, while still acknowledging the unnecessary suffering inflicted by Stalin. Instead,

7: Eurasian Development Bank Centre for Integration Studies, ‘EDB integration barometer – 2016 (Fifth wave of the survey),’ October 2016.
Putin has chosen to re-open old wounds, particularly in Ukraine. By describing the overthrow of Yanukovych in 2014 as a Nazi coup backed by the West, he achieved a tactical success: he turned Russian public opinion rapidly against Ukrainians, ensuring support for the annexation of Crimea and the (unacknowledged) invasion of eastern Ukraine. He also reminded some in the West, including sections of Polish society, that Ukrainian partisans had fought with the Nazis against the Soviet forces and against Poles (while ignoring the fact that many had also fought against the Nazis, in an effort to establish an independent Ukraine).

“Moscow claims the right to protect compatriots, and has used this right to justify interfering in neighbouring countries.”

The cost of Putin’s actions against Kyiv, however, was that he alienated Ukraine, which had had a favourable view of Russia up to that point. The number of Ukrainians regarding Russia as an unfriendly country rose from under 20 per cent in 2013 to over 70 per cent in 2015.8

Similar problems of history bedevil Russia’s relations with other Eastern European states. As in any former empire, the history books of the imperial power and of its subjects tell different stories. Depending on one’s point of view, Russia either intervened in Georgia in the early 19th century to protect it from attacks from the Ottoman and Persian empires, or deposed the last king of Georgia and annexed the country. Similarly, Russia either subverted and conquered Georgia in 1921, having recognised its independence in 1920; or was forced to respond to Georgian interference in Russia’s North Caucasus and Soviet Armenia. And in more recent history, Russia’s need to persuade Abkhazia and South Ossetia that it has saved them from ‘genocide’ (as Putin claimed in justifying the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia) gets in the way of improved relations with Tbilisi. Putin’s use of his version of the past for domestic purposes makes it harder not to give offence abroad.

Russia also views its diaspora as a soft power asset, as many countries do. It is unusual, however, in the extent to which it instrumentalises groups of people in neighbouring countries, with whom it claims some affinity. The break-up of the Soviet Union left many ethnic Russians outside the borders of the Russian Federation. Some of these returned to Russia; some took Russian citizenship but stayed where they were; and some took local citizenship or remained stateless.

In the 1990s Russia began trying to devise policies to deal with these ‘compatriots’ – those who had some connection to Russia but were not citizens. The definition of a ‘compatriot’ is loose: on one reading of Russian legislation and official statements it can cover “any person who feels a spiritual or cultural connection with Russia and is descended from any of the 185 current nationalities that used to inhabit the Russian imperial territories”.9 Moscow claims the right to protect compatriots, not only citizens, abroad, and has repeatedly used this right to justify interfering in neighbouring countries.10 In some cases it has bolstered its claim to a legitimate interest by issuing Russian passports to disaffected groups: in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, though the residents technically remained Georgian citizens, Russia had enrolled the vast majority of them as Russian citizens before the war of 2008.

With a softer approach, Russia might be able to create a friendly constituency in neighbouring states with strong historical ties to Moscow; but as James Sherr of Chatham House says: “Russia’s authorities have a habit of telling compatriots where they belong”.11 Such an approach can produce resistance in communities that might otherwise be well-disposed to Russia. Answering a question from Charles Grant of the CER at the Valdai Forum in 2013, Putin suggested that Russians and Ukrainians were “one people”. He might have done more harm than good to Russia’s relationship with Russian-speaking Ukrainian citizens, who opinion polls consistently showed did not regard themselves as Russians.12 Too much Russian attention to compatriots can also create suspicion between them and the majority nationality, which may see Russian compatriots as a potentially hostile force. And it can damage the bilateral relationship between Russia and the other government, if the latter believes that Moscow is trying to create divisions in society.

In a number of Eastern European countries, Russia has tried to make use of religious affinity to build closer popular ties, sometimes bypassing the local regime. In his address proposing the annexation of Crimea, Putin stressed the region’s religious significance, as the place where the Slavic pagan Prince Vladimir was baptised – an act which Putin claimed laid the foundation for the culture and values, “that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus”.13 Russia has argued that “the erosion of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” is a threat to national security.14 The close links between the Russian

8: Eurasian Development Bank Centre for Integration Studies, EDB integration barometer - 2016 (Fifth wave of the survey); October 2016.
10: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No 605, ‘On measures for the implementation of the foreign policy direction of the Russian Federation’, May 7th 2012
Orthodox Church (which was largely controlled by the KGB in the Soviet era) and the Kremlin have been useful in some cases: relations between the Russian and Georgian Orthodox Churches are much better than those between the Russian and Georgian governments. The Belarusian and Moldovan Orthodox Churches are subordinate to Moscow. Thomas de Waal described Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church as “probably the most effective instrument of soft power in the near abroad.” But the Russian Orthodox Church has lost influence in Ukraine as a result of the war between Kyiv and Moscow. Many Ukrainians have shifted their allegiance away from the Ukrainian Orthodox Church that answers to the Moscow Patriarchate to one of the two branches of the church with Patriarchs in Kyiv.16

“The Eastern Partnership is failing to produce the stability, better governance and economic development that the EU hoped for.”

Another element in the Kremlin’s efforts to create pro-Russian communities in neighbouring countries has been the Russian language; and language and religion have been linked together in the concept of Russkiy Mir (‘Russian World’). Putin established the Russkiy Mir Foundation in 2007, in part as a Russian counterpart for Western organisations like the British Council and the Goethe Institute. Its tasks include support for teaching Russian; but also “spreading objective information about modern Russia and Russian compatriots, and creating on that basis favourable public opinion in relation to Russia”. It co-operates with the Russian Orthodox Church and other confessions “to advance Russian language and culture”. Indeed, it has the enthusiastic support of the church: Patriarch Kirill said in 2009 that “only a consolidated Russian world could become a powerful subject in global politics”.18

Both the foundation and Putin himself have a very broad interpretation of what the ‘Russian world’ is and what it means to belong to it. As early as 2001, Putin told a meeting of compatriot organisations in the concept of Russkiy Mir (‘Russian World’). Putin established the Russkiy Mir Foundation in 2007, in part as a Russian counterpart for Western organisations like the British Council and the Goethe Institute. Its tasks include support for teaching Russian; but also “spreading objective information about modern Russia and Russian compatriots, and creating on that basis favourable public opinion in relation to Russia”. It co-operates with the Russian Orthodox Church and other confessions “to advance Russian language and culture”. Indeed, it has the enthusiastic support of the church: Patriarch Kirill said in 2009 that “only a consolidated Russian world could become a powerful subject in global politics”.18

As with compatriot policy more generally, the problem with the ‘Russian World’ project is that it alienates as many people as it attracts. It is a long journey from wanting to learn the Russian language (even if it is the language of one’s ancestors) to wanting to serve Russia. The policy is likely to be especially provocative in neighbouring countries with communities that might be attracted to Russia. Even Lukashenko said in his annual message to the Belarusian people in 2015 that the idea of the ‘Russian World’ “is not about us”.19

Russia’s policy towards the countries of Eastern Europe is self-defeating because it keeps over-reaching. Russia could let states work out for themselves that while Europe may be the bigger economic partner for them, they also have an interest in good political and economic relations with Russia. Instead, Moscow is always looking for a lever to force them closer to it. It fears that if it cannot drag them into its own orbit, it will inevitably lose them to the West. For the Eastern European countries to join the EU would be bad enough; but (so Russian officials claim) EU membership is the first step on the road to inevitable NATO membership. Putin himself made this linkage in suggesting that one motive for annexing Crimea was to prevent the port of Sevastopol falling into NATO’s hands. Yet the dispute that had led to the Euromaidan protests and ultimately to the revolution in Ukraine was about the association agreement with the EU; it had no bearing on whether Ukraine wanted to join NATO or whether NATO would admit it as a member.

As a result of its misguided beliefs – first, that the EU and NATO are likely to expand further east in the foreseeable future, and second that such an expansion, if it ever happened, would threaten Russia’s interests – Russia has used potential soft power instruments coercively; and it has not shrunk from using or threatening to use its hard power. The Soviet 14th Army, based in Transnistria, fought against the Moldovan government in the early 1990s; Russian forces are still there, ostensibly in a peacekeeping role. Russian troops were in Crimea before its annexation; the Yanukovych Administration had extended Russia’s lease on military facilities at Sevastopol and elsewhere until 2042, in return for long-term supplies of gas at a discount price. The presence of Russian forces in Crimea facilitated the covert deployment of the so-called ‘little green men’ who took over the peninsula before its annexation. Russian forces have been in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (originally, in the latter case, with the grudging acquiescence of the Georgian authorities) since the conflicts of the early 1990s; after the 2008 war Russia turned its ‘peacekeepers’ into more substantial combat forces in the two regions. It has bases in Belarus (though Lukashenko has resisted Russia’s proposals to expand its military presence there) and in Armenia. Only Azerbaijan, where the Russians vacated their last base in 2012, has no Russian troops on its territory.

16: James Coyle, ‘Thanks to Russia, Ukrainians swell ranks of Kyiv patriarchate’, Atlantic Council, June 22nd 2016.
17: Fond Russkiy Mir website (in Russian).
19: ‘Lukashenko: Russkiy Mir - eto ne pro nas’ [Lukashenko: The Russian World - it is not for us (Russian)], REGNUM Information Agency, April 29th 2015.
On the other side, the Eastern Partnership is failing to produce the “stability, better governance and economic development” that the EU hoped for when the initiative was launched in 2008. Of the six countries, the two most politically stable are Azerbaijan and Belarus – which are also the most repressive. Azerbaijan has made the greatest economic progress, but only because of its good fortune in having oil and gas. Belarus has tried to preserve as much as it could of the Soviet economic model.

“If the EU has offered its partners no hope, NATO has if anything made a worse mistake in offering some of them false hope.”

The other countries have embraced capitalism to varying degrees; but in almost every case their economies have been dominated by a class of oligarchs who took control of the best parts of the Soviet economy when the USSR collapsed. These oligarchies have indulged in corruption on a grand scale, suborning courts and law enforcement agencies and using them against their rivals, buying votes and then buying politicians. They have often maintained murky links with equally corrupt groups in Russia: the gas trade between Russia and Ukraine was a notorious area in which oligarchs on both sides got rich at the expense of the national interest. In Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, Georgia and Belarus are the best performers, in 44th and 79th places respectively out of a total of 176 countries assessed. Both are rated by Transparency International as having become at least a little less corrupt in the last year. But the remaining countries range from Armenia (113th place, and getting more corrupt) to Ukraine (131st place, tied with Russia).

The Eastern Partnership offers countries the chance to begin a difficult journey towards becoming more like states in Western and Central Europe; but it does not offer them any reward for making it to the end of the journey. The EU has consistently refused to offer Eastern Partnership countries a prospect, however remote, that if they meet all the necessary conditions they might one day be able to join the Union. The association agreements signed with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine will, if the three countries implement them thoroughly, enable them to meet European standards; that will give them some benefit in trade with third countries that recognise European standards, as well as with the EU itself. But they will have to make reforms which will be difficult and will challenge established ways of doing business in the region; and they will do this without the incentive of EU membership at the end (unlike the countries of Central Europe and the Western Balkans in their transition processes). The absence of a positive goal has been demoralizing: in Georgia, support for membership of the EU fell from around 80 per cent in a series of opinion polls between 2009 and 2013 to 61 per cent in an identical poll in 2015.

The EU saw the Eastern Partnership prior to the Vilnius summit of 2013 as a purely technocratic exercise; it barely registered as a political matter, let alone a geopolitical issue which would seriously damage relations between the West and Russia. Former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt was only partly joking when he told a civil society event in the margins of the Vilnius summit that “Putin makes you an offer you can’t refuse; the EU makes you an offer you can’t understand”.

If the EU has offered its partners no hope, NATO has if anything made a worse mistake in offering some of them false hope. The Bucharest Summit promise in 2008 that Georgia and Ukraine would join NATO was made by most member-states reluctantly, with no timetable or clear process for joining the alliance. But it was enough to give Russia a motive to invade Georgia and create ‘independent’ states in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, knowing that NATO would never offer a defence guarantee to a country with disputed borders or foreign troops occupying its territory. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had the same effect: allies will not advance Kyiv’s membership application as long as doing so would mean NATO defending a country already in conflict with Russia. President Poroshenko has recently announced that he will hold a referendum on NATO membership, but this is an empty gesture, since it will not change the reality that there is no consensus among existing NATO members to let Ukraine in. If anything, such a referendum is likely to increase the sense of disillusionment with the West among Ukrainians, and give substance to Russian suggestions that the West does not want Ukraine.

Since Bucharest, Georgia has done all that could be asked of it, contributing troops to the NATO-led ISAF force in Afghanistan and to the follow-on mission, and to other NATO and EU operations. In response, NATO has acknowledged that “Georgia’s relationship with the Alliance contains all the practical tools to prepare for eventual membership”. But NATO has never given Georgia any indication of when or whether it would offer Tbiliisi a Membership Action Plan (the most important formal step on the way to membership). The result of NATO making an offer that it is not going to honour in

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the foreseeable future has been increased instability in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. As long as Russia perceives NATO and the EU as threats to its interests, it has every reason to make Eastern European countries look like unattractive allies and partners for the West.

“The reality is that further enlargement of both NATO and the EU is off the table for the foreseeable future.”

The reality is, however, that further enlargement of both NATO and the EU is off the table for the foreseeable future. In the case of the EU, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker told the European Parliament in 2014 that there would be no enlargement for the next five years. By 2019 the UK, traditionally one of the most enthusiastic supporters of enlargement, will have left the EU or be on the verge of leaving it; there is no country of comparable weight that would push for Eastern European countries to be given a membership perspective. And even if EU governments accepted any of the Eastern partners as potential candidate countries, these countries would spend many years if not decades reaching EU standards. Moreover, all existing EU member-states would have to ratify their accession. Dutch voters rejected the EU association agreement with Ukraine in 2016 in the mistaken belief that it would lead to membership; they would certainly not vote in favour of an accession treaty for any Eastern European country.

In the case of NATO, Russia’s occupation of Georgian, Moldovan and Ukrainian territory provides it with a de facto veto over their membership in the alliance. Even if the three countries were willing to give up any claim to their lost regions in order to prove to NATO that they had no territorial conflicts, few if any NATO members would be willing to extend NATO’s defence guarantee to the remainder, for fear that Russia would immediately challenge the alliance to defend its new members. In an ideal world, the invasions of Georgia and Ukraine might have been avoided if Russia had believed that NATO would defend them; but even before the election of Donald Trump as American president, there was no political enthusiasm for extending NATO further east, or asserting the sovereign right of countries to choose their own allies, in the face of clear and belligerent Russian opposition.

It is too early to know what effect President Trump will have on Western soft power in Eastern Europe. The early signs are that he (though not his Cabinet) views Russia primarily as a potential ally in the conflict with Islamist terrorism, rather than as a threat to European security. He shows little interest in the fate of Ukraine: the official White House account of a conversation with Poroshenko on February 4th 2017 quoted Trump as saying “We will work with Ukraine, Russia, and all other parties involved to help them restore peace along the border” – a strange way to describe a conflict involving Russian troops deep inside Ukraine, and a phrase which ignores Crimea altogether. In July 2016, when still a candidate, Trump suggested that if elected he would look at recognising the annexation of Crimea. On the other hand, his press spokesman told reporters on February 8th 2017 that sanctions against Russia would not be lifted until Russia left Crimea.

Trump may be moderating his previously sharp criticism of NATO (which he described as obsolete); but he also seems keen to stress the importance of allies paying for their own defence. Were NATO to take in new members in Eastern Europe, it seems likely that (notwithstanding Georgia’s contributions to NATO missions) these states would need more security help from their allies than they could contribute to others. So it is hard to see a scenario in which either NATO or the EU will embrace any of the Eastern European countries, though they may continue to have co-operative relations with most of them. The Eastern Europeans will continue to be on the outside of the organisations which have provided their Western neighbours with prosperity and security.

Conclusion and recommendations

All the parties in the region – the West, Russia and the Eastern European countries themselves – seem to be stuck in transition from the world of 1991 to something else. At present they cannot agree what. In the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the West, the Soviet bloc and the neutrals agreed that all European states had “the right to belong or not to belong to international organisations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality”. Russia challenges that fundamental principle; yet by refusing to take any Eastern European country seriously as a potential future member, so does the West.

What can the countries of Eastern Europe do if the West is not willing to help them assert their rights in the face of Russian pressure? If they, like Ukraine, do not want to be press-ganged into the EAEU or other Russian-dominated organisations, what are their best options? And if Russia finds that putting more pressure on its neighbours to align themselves with Moscow only ends up by alienating them, can it come up with a more effective way to ensure
that it is not surrounded by hostile countries? There are ways in which Eastern Europe can become an asset to its neighbours to the east and west, as well as providing a better life for its inhabitants, but they will not be easy, politically or practically.

"Unless Eastern partners improve governance and modernise their economies, they will remain fragile."

The starting point for Eastern European countries is to work on improving their internal resilience. Corruption and the absence of the rule of law have made these countries weaker and created elites with vested interests in the status quo. Ukraine has shown that even with an active and engaged civil society, it is hard to displace oligarchs who own media outlets, judges and members of parliament. But unless Eastern partners improve governance, modernise their economies and make themselves more attractive investment destinations, they will remain economically and politically fragile. There are good reasons to follow the prescriptions laid down by the EU and NATO for acceding countries, even if accession is not on the agenda.

Eastern European countries can also increase their resilience by ensuring that minority linguistic or ethnic groups feel that they have a stake in the success of the state. Georgia’s problems with Abkhazia and South Ossetia began when the country’s first post-independence president, the nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia, abolished the autonomous status of the two regions, creating a grievance which Russia was able to exploit and nurture for more than a decade, until the war of 2008. Moldovan nationalists alienated the Gagauz (a Turkic minority in the south of the country) when even before Moldova’s formal independence from the Soviet Union they made Romanian the official language of the republic. That suggested that they planned to reunite with Romania, a country with which the Gagauz felt no affinity. The effects were long-lasting: in 2014 Gagauzia held a referendum (not legally recognised by the Moldovan government) in which 98.4 per cent of voters favoured closer relations with the Eurasian Customs Union, while 97.2 per cent rejected closer integration with the EU.

By contrast, the failure of Russia to find much support for its invasion in 2014 may reflect the fact that ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians living in the east of the country did not feel discriminated against and did feel themselves to be Ukrainian: according to a 2013 poll by the Razumkov Centre (a Ukrainian polling organisation), 81 per cent of residents of the east considered themselves ‘patriots of Ukraine’.24

The EU’s Eastern Partners should also diversify their foreign relations: they do not have to be the prisoners of their geography, tied either to the West or Russia. Ukraine has already shown interest in joining China’s ‘16 plus 1’ mechanism (which groups Beijing with the Central European EU member-states and the Western Balkan countries). It would like to be involved in the ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative (the primary goal of which is to improve transport links between China and Europe). China is Ukraine’s fourth largest export market (after the EU, Russia and Turkey). China has also invested in Ukrainian agribusiness, and encouraged the international financial institutions to ensure Ukraine’s financial and economic stability during Kyiv’s conflict with Russia, even as Moscow was trying to block disbursement of IMF loans to Ukraine.24

Georgia too has been working to strengthen its ties to China. In October 2015 the governments of Georgia and China co-sponsored the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum to discuss OBOR.25 In December 2015 the first train carrying goods from China arrived in Georgia en route to Turkey. It is not yet clear whether this route can be commercially viable (while there are plenty of goods to travel west, there is a risk of empty cars travelling east), but the plan is to get goods from China to Europe in about 15 days, compared with around 30 days by sea.26 Georgia and China have also negotiated a free trade agreement (which should enter into force later this year, after ratification). By giving China and others such as Turkey (a key patron of Azerbaijan) a stake in their continued stability and sovereignty, the countries of Eastern Europe may be able to leverage Moscow’s wish for close and friendly relations with Beijing and Ankara.

As long as the Eastern Europeans have a range of international partners with an interest in their well-being, there is no reason why they should not also try to develop good political and trade relations with Moscow. The key is that the relationship should be based on sovereign equality and mutual benefit, not on Soviet-era linkages, involuntary membership of the ‘Russian World’ or economic and military coercion. Russia’s economy is likely to start growing again this year, albeit slowly, creating more demand for imported goods; it will continue to need migrant workers; and it will remain an important source of energy at competitive prices. But Eastern European states, even those that have good reasons to remain on friendly terms with Russia, as Armenia and Belarus do, will do better if they avoid

being totally dependent on Moscow’s good will. As Agnia Grigas commented: “There is a thin line between Russia’s soft power, partnership and alliance on one hand and its coercion and blackmail on the other.”27

The EU should be doing more to help increase resilience in its Eastern partners. Its leverage is limited in countries like Azerbaijan that do not aspire to European integration; but in countries that see themselves as potential members of the Union in some distant future, the EU has more influence. The visa liberalisation processes between the EU and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine provide a good example: the three countries have had to meet specific benchmarks in areas such as combating corruption and preventing citizens of third countries from entering the EU illegally via their territory.

“Eastern partners do not have to be the prisoners of their geography, tied either to the West or Russia.”

The problems come when conditions are either relaxed or tightened for political reasons: while Moldovans have had visa-free access to the EU since 2014, Ukraine and Georgia have had to wait while the EU changed its own rules to strengthen the ‘suspension mechanism’, allowing it to cancel visa liberalisation if too many people enter the EU.28 The risk is that Eastern European populations become more susceptible to Russian messages that the West wants to keep Eastern Partners at arm’s length.

In combating corruption in Eastern European countries the EU has tended to focus on strengthening and supporting civil society organisations, and on diplomatic pressure on governments. It has done less than it should to put direct pressure on those involved in corruption, whose money often passes through EU member-states in the process of being laundered.

One of the most notorious cases, the so-called ‘Russian laundromat’ exposed by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project in 2014, involved companies in Russia, banks in Moldova and Latvia and UK and US-based front companies laundering $20 billion in a seven year period.29 The Latvian regulator eventually closed down the Latvian bank concerned in 2016, but to date no-one has been convicted of involvement in the money-laundering. In 2014 in a separate case, the UK froze $23 million in assets which it suspected were the proceeds of corruption scandals involving nominally pro-EU figures in Azerbaijan.29 One of the most notorious cases, the so-called ‘Russian laundromat’ exposed by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project in 2014, involved companies in Russia, banks in Moldova and Latvia and UK and US-based front companies laundering $20 billion in a seven year period.29 The Latvian regulator eventually closed down the Latvian bank concerned in 2016, but to date no-one has been convicted of involvement in the money-laundering. In 2014 in a separate case, the UK froze $23 million in assets which it suspected were the proceeds of corruption scandals involving nominally pro-EU figures in Azerbaijan.

The West’s policy towards Eastern Europe so far has been one of (relatively) benign indecision. The EU and NATO need to think more seriously about their aims and means in the region. Whatever the merits of the cases, for the foreseeable future there will be no consensus on absorbing any of the Eastern partners into the EU or NATO, or even helping them to defend themselves in the face of Russian aggression. So when NATO leaders continue to proclaim that the alliance has an open door policy; or when the EU says ambiguously that its association agreement with Ukraine “does not constitute the final goal in EU-Ukraine co-operation”, they raise hopes in Eastern Europe, and fears in the Kremlin, that are divorced from reality.31

At the moment, it seems almost impossible to make the right choice: the West can either concede that Russia has a veto over the foreign policy orientation of its neighbours; or assert the right of the six states to join the EU and NATO, while knowing that in practice most Western countries would not be ready to defend them against attack. Perhaps the most the West can do is to quietly build up the resilience of any of the six that want Western help, while patiently talking to Moscow in the hope that some future Russian leader will accept that it is in both Russia’s interest and the West’s that their shared neighbours are prosperous, stable and well-governed. By the time any Eastern European state qualifies to join a Western organisation even Putin will have given way to another Russian president, perhaps with a different geopolitical outlook.

Even as they maintain that NATO expansion poses a great threat to them, the Russians must know that of the countries that joined the alliance after the Cold War only Estonia and Poland spend a greater percentage of their GDP on defence now than they did when they joined; the defence budgets of Bulgaria and Hungary are around 25 per cent and 20 per cent respectively lower than when they became NATO members. And between 2007 and 2013 trade between Russia and the former communist countries now in the EU rose by almost 70 per cent (though it has subsequently fallen sharply as a result of sanctions, counter-sanctions and low oil and gas prices). If Russia plays its cards right, there is no reason to think that the Eastern Europeans would follow a different path: in all likelihood they too would spend less on defence and become more prosperous consumers than they are now.

The question is whether Russia can see its neighbours in a different light, not as potential threats but as potential partners. The great American diplomat and Kremlinologist George Kennan wrote in 1944, “The jealous eye of the Kremlin can distinguish, in the end, only vassals and enemies; and the neighbors of Russia, if they do not wish to be one, must reconcile themselves to being the other.” The leaders of the Russian Federation have spent most of the last quarter century proving Kennan right. In Russia’s current internal political and economic situation, Putin finds it convenient to be surrounded by enemies, even at the cost of alienating neighbours who could be friends. But that is a policy choice, not a historical inevitability.

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