



*The US elections
and Europe:
The coming crisis of
high expectations*



Kori Schake



The Centre for European Reform is a think-tank devoted to improving the quality of the debate on the European Union. It is a forum for people with ideas from Britain and across the continent to discuss the many political, economic and social challenges facing Europe. It seeks to work with similar bodies in other European countries, North America and elsewhere in the world.

The CER is pro-European but not uncritical. It regards European integration as largely beneficial but recognises that in many respects the Union does not work well. The CER therefore aims to promote new ideas for reforming the European Union.

Director: CHARLES GRANT
ADVISORY BOARD

PERCY BARNEVIK..... Board member, General Motors and Former Chairman, AstraZeneca
ANTONIO BORGES..... Former Dean of INSEAD
NICK BUTLER (CHAIR)..... Director, Centre for Energy Security & Sustainable Development, Cambridge
IAIN CONN Group Managing Director and Chief Executive, Refining & Marketing, BP p.l.c.
LORD DAHRENDORF Former Warden of St Antony's College, Oxford & European Commissioner
VERNON ELLIS..... International Chairman, Accenture
RICHARD HAASS..... President, Council on Foreign Relations
LORD HANNAY..... Former Ambassador to the UN & the EU
IAN HARGREAVES..... Senior Partner, Ofcom
LORD HASKINS Former Chairman, Northern Foods
FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG..... Senior Advisor, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique
LORD KERR..... Chairman of Imperial College London and Deputy Chairman of Royal Dutch Shell plc
CIAO KOCH-WESER..... Vice Chairman, Deutsche Bank Group
IORELLA KOSTORIS PADOA SCHIOPPA..... Professor, La Sapienza University, Rome
RICHARD LAMBERT..... Director General, The Confederation of British Industry
PASCAL LAMY..... Director General, WTO and Former European Commissioner
DAVID MARSH..... Chairman, London & Oxford Group
DOMINIQUE MOÏSI..... Senior Advisor, Institut Français des Relations Internationales
JOHN MONKS..... General Secretary, European Trade Union Confederation
BARONESS PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES..... Shadow Security Minister
CHRISTINE OCKRENT..... Editor in chief, France Télévision
WANDA RAPACZYNSKI..... Former President of Management Board, Agora SA
LORD ROBERTSON..... Deputy Chairman, Cable and Wireless and Former Secretary General, NATO
KORI SCHAKE..... Research Fellow, Hoover Institution and Bradley Professor, West Point
LORD SIMON Former Minister for Trade and Competitiveness in Europe
PETER SUTHERLAND..... Chairman, BP p.l.c. and Goldman Sachs International
LORD TURNER Chairman, UK Pensions Commission and non-executive Director, Standard Chartered PLC
ANTÓNIO VITORINO..... Former European Commissioner

Published by the Centre for European Reform (CER), 14 Great College Street, London, SW1P 3RX
Telephone +44 20 7233 1199, Facsimile +44 20 7233 1117, info@cer.org.uk, www.cer.org.uk
© CER NOVEMBER 2007 ★ ISBN 978 1 901229 77 6

The US elections and Europe

The coming crisis of high expectations

Kori Schake

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Kori Schake is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Distinguished Chair of International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. She served on the National Security Council during President George W Bush's first term. She previously worked at the Pentagon and taught at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the University of Maryland and the National Defense University.

AUTHOR'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to Charles Grant for spurring my thinking, enforcing clarity, and making me write my thoughts down. Peter Berkowitz, Paul Gebhard, Erik Leklem and George Robertson all sharpened my thinking. This is a much better publication – substantively and editorially – thanks to the work of the CER, and especially Tomas Valasek. Any remaining errors that escaped notice remain my own. The CER would like to thank the German Marshall Fund of the US for their generous support of this publication.



Copyright of this publication is held by the Centre for European Reform. You may not copy, reproduce, republish or circulate in any way the content from this publication except for your own personal and non-commercial use. Any other use requires the prior written permission of the Centre for European Reform.

Contents

About the author

Author's acknowledgements

1	Introduction	1
2	Who next after George W Bush?	3
3	Foreign policy in a new administration: areas of disagreement	9
4	Foreign policy in a new administration: areas of agreement	15
5	Dogs that aren't barking	21
6	The lessons of Iraq	27
7	Is Europe a winnable constituency?	33

1 Introduction

Over the past seven years Americans and Europeans have been surprised to find each other different and disappointing in unexpected ways. From an American perspective, it stings to have such a large and long-standing investment in Europe's security produce so little goodwill. From a European perspective, it is genuinely shocking to see the United States making choices so jarring to European sensibilities and acting largely unconcerned about the erosion of public support for America and its policies.

As the United States transitions from George W Bush to a new administration, we are likely to experience yet another transatlantic crisis – this time one of rising expectations unfulfilled. Europeans will expect a more pliable, chastened and multilateral United States. They will want it to start solving problems on terms comfortable to Europeans. The US will expect a more helpful Europe that will take more responsibility and run risks to solve common problems. Neither aspiration will be met.

In fact, the likeliest forecast for the next few years is that the US, frustrated with criticism from its closest friends and the stinginess of their contributions, will hold back. What Europeans are likely to hear out of Washington is: “If you're so much smarter and more virtuous than we are, you solve this one.”

It is the ‘Atlas shrugged’ scenario: the most powerful nation refuses to shoulder the burden because so many others have not done more.¹ As a hegemon, it knows that it can ride out the effects of a violent and chaotic international order better than other states. The US is likely to focus on defence rather than offence. It will seek to shield itself from the effects of problems which, it now believes, cannot

¹ *Ayn Rand, 'Atlas shrugged', Random House, 1957.*

be solved in their places of origin. Its relations with allies will acquire a harder edge. The Americans will question – however unfairly – why they are incurring the preponderant costs of attempting to fix collective problems. We could see a return to the transatlantic burden-sharing debates of the 1970s, in which the US linked its participation in military operations to the proportion of European contributions.

This would be a genuinely dangerous outcome. The tasks before us – combating terrorism, managing the global financial system, reducing energy dependence and addressing climate change – require close US-European co-operation. Leaders on both sides of the Atlantic need to adjust their sights. Any changes that the new American president introduces will be evolutionary, not revolutionary. The US and Europe will need a more focused partnership that makes incremental improvements wherever opportunities arise. It will require patience on the part of European leaders. The US will take years to regain its strength after Iraq. Until that happens it will hold back from new engagements. In the meantime, the Europeans will need to do what Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, excels in: identify problems, take initiatives, craft agreements other countries can support, and then turn to the US for the contribution needed to close or enforce the deal.

2 Who next after George W Bush?

The next US presidential election is around the corner. President Bush's successor will be elected in November 2008. Even so, it is too soon to accurately predict the outcome of the elections. At the time of writing (November 2007) a contest between Hillary Clinton and former Mayor of New York, Rudy Giuliani, seems likely. If so, the Democratic candidate may well enter the race severely weakened by the Democratic primary vote. It is here, when the party selects its candidate, that Senator Clinton may lose the national election.

Her challenge comes from Senator Barack Obama, and the hope he inspires among Americans. Senator Clinton holds the advantage in terms of experienced personnel and has the national organisation that candidates need to rally millions of voters. Were Obama to gracefully play for vice president or for the heir apparent, Clinton could secure the nomination with a broad base of Democratic support.

However, Senator Obama does not appear to be settling for second place. In the summer of 2007, he stepped up his attacks on Senator Clinton's foreign policy, calling it, among other things, "Bush-Cheney lite".² When he suggested that he would support operations inside Pakistan without the Pakistani government's approval, Senator Clinton dismissed him with: "You can think big, but remember, you shouldn't always say everything you think if you are running for president, because it has consequences around the world. And we don't need that right now."³

² Katherine Seelye and Michael Falcone, 'Obama says Clinton is Bush-Cheney lite', *New York Times*, July 27th 2007.

³ Kim Chipman and Michael Forsythe, 'Clinton, Obama skirmish over Pakistan, lobbyists at Labour forum', *Bloomberg.com*, August 8th 2007.

This highlights Senator Clinton's weak spot. The challenge from Obama may require her to be very ruthless. This could leave Senator Clinton looking like Lady Macbeth, increasing the large number of Americans already determined to vote against her. A nasty confrontation with Obama would badly damage her prospects of winning the general election, and make it difficult to unite a Democratic party even more fractious than usual because of the war in Iraq.

Republican candidates are largely campaigning on the issue of managerial competence. Unusually for US elections, there is only one prominent social conservative in the race, and he, former Senator Fred Thompson, had an undistinguished career in the Senate. Former Governor Mitt Romney's and Rudy Giuliani's track records as successful managers have pushed them to the fore. Of these two, Giuliani stands a better chance. While he is socially liberal – a substantial handicap with the party's voting base – the country's emotional association with him as 'the nation's mayor' after September 11th make him the favourite to secure the nomination.

A contest between Clinton and Giuliani in November 2008 would play to her weaknesses but his advantage. His socially liberal views make him an acceptable candidate to many moderate voters, while her presence on the ticket will convince conservatives to vote against her. Moreover, Senator Clinton's effort to hold the middle ground on Iraq may cost her the votes of left-wing Democrats.

This is, of course, all hypothetical. The electoral results are notoriously tricky to predict. Moreover, several new factors promise to affect the electoral outcome. These are: changes to the primary system, voter fatigue with conservative issues, and the Democrats' ability to win support from new groups of voters.

Primaries

The sequencing of American elections traditionally gave enormous weight to the small states of New Hampshire and Iowa, which voted

first. Candidates spend much time campaigning here, hoping to rise above the competition (the frontrunners) or to improve their odds (the long shots). The voters of Iowa and New Hampshire, in turn, scrutinise the candidates more closely than in any other states. The local primaries thus serve as a proxy for the nation. California, a state of over 36 million people, producing 13 per cent of the country's total GDP (a figure that would make an independent California the world's 5th largest economy) used to have a disproportionately small weight in the primary elections – the candidate was effectively chosen before the state held its poll. But California has brought forward its primary, and this has had a cascading effect on other states. The end result is that 14 states will hold a 'big bang' primary on February 5th 2008, which will effectively select the candidates for both political parties. Iowa and New Hampshire have moved their votes forward to January, but their primaries will no longer have the same effect.

The new schedule will aid front runners and identifiable names at the expense of lesser-known candidates. It will also make it more difficult for dark horse candidates like the former Vice President, Al Gore, to make a late entry into the race. The change in the primary calendar will also mean that the selection is made by a less informed electorate than would be the case in New Hampshire and Iowa.

Fatigue among social conservatives

Polls of voter attitudes show that national security and governmental competence have become the central issues among voters in Republican primaries. This comes at the expense of the divisive issues of private morality. Abortion, religion and related concerns have in recent decades dominated the Republican discourse, with conservatives holding the balance of power in the party. The polls also show that public support for assertive national security policies has become substantially softer, and that the Republican party's traditional advantage in managerial ⁴ *Margaret Talev, 'More GOP voters calling for Iraq timeline', Miami Herald, June 28th 2007.* competence has been badly damaged by the performance of the Bush administration.⁴

In general, voters are concerned about the social safety net and income inequality, which are traditionally winning issues for the Democrats.

If conservative issues do hold less sway at election time, the Democratic candidates stand to benefit. Among the Republicans, former Senator Fred Thompson and former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, the most socially conservative of the current candidates, will lose some of their appeal. Less concern about morality will boost the prospects of Rudy Giuliani. He will pay less of a penalty for his support for abortion rights, gay marriage and other policies anathema to social conservatives. Thirst for managerial competence will help both Romney and Giuliani. They both achieved executive success as governor and mayor, respectively. It will hurt McCain, Thompson, and other senatorial aspirants for the nomination.

A Democratic US?

Democrats have made substantial gains over the past few years. In 2002, the American voting public was evenly divided, with 43 per cent each identifying themselves as Republicans or Democrats. Currently, more than 50 per cent of voters identify themselves as Democrats or leaning toward the Democratic party, with only 35 per

⁵ *Pew Center on Public Attitudes, 'Trends in political values and core attitudes, 1987-2007: Political landscape more favourable to Democrats', March 2007.*

cent committed Republicans. Moreover, the Bush administration has significantly damaged the standing of the Republicans: the proportion of voters with a positive view of the Republican party has diminished by 15 per cent.⁵

Structural advantages, of course, do not necessarily produce electoral victories. The American political system is intensely personal, and the vicissitudes of candidates and campaigns matter enormously. But the arithmetic of a growing Democratic base is a new and serious problem for Republicans. It shows that the Republican party's long-term strategy of wooing minority groups

such as Latinos and portions of the black community (socially conservative but traditionally Democratic) may have foundered. The Republicans' efforts at outreach, and their high-profile minority appointments have not attracted enough support to overcome negative minority perceptions on critical issues like immigration, inner-city crime and poverty.

Taken together these three structural changes will help established, moderate candidates. Democrats will receive a boost because of their increased numbers. Republicans will have a less fervent conservative base. These trends are likely to strengthen the centre of American politics.

3 Foreign policy in a new administration: areas of disagreement

Iraq

It is rare that foreign policy determines an American presidential election. Other countries may expect the world's hegemon to subject its leaders-in-waiting to intense foreign policy scrutiny, but that is rarely the case. Foreign policy tends to be a gateway issue: a candidate needs to show sound knowledge in order to be taken seriously, but specific policy choices are almost never important.

That, however, was before Iraq. In 2008, the war will probably loom large. The public is very concerned about the administration's conduct of the war, and all Democratic candidates advocate withdrawal of US forces (albeit along differing timelines). All candidates will be judged by their previous support or opposition to the war and by their proposals for winding down US involvement.

Republicans will be at a significant disadvantage because of public weariness with the war. Nearly 60 per cent of Americans believe the US should withdraw from Iraq, with only 36 per cent believing the US should stay for as long as it takes.⁶ Opposition to the war is even stronger among Democrats, 73 per cent of whom believe the US should withdraw.

Iraq is a bitter and strongly motivating campaign issue on the left. Democratic candidates John Edwards and Barak Obama are turning up the heat on Senator Clinton for her votes in favour of the war,

and her efforts to steer a middle course on withdrawal. She is caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, she needs to act like a commander in chief (especially critical for a female candidate, which is probably the best explanation of her votes in favour of the war and its continued funding). On the other hand, support for the war could cost her the left wing of her party.

Senator Edwards is the most strident of the candidates in calling for withdrawal. He wants Congress to cut off funding for the war, the US to immediately reduce troops to 40,000-50,000, and the remaining forces to leave within a year. Yet even Edwards wants to retain enough troops in Iraq to “prevent a genocide, deter a regional spillover of the civil war, and prevent an al-Qaeda safe haven”.⁷

Senator Obama advocates withdrawing all American troops by March 2008 (the date established by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group). Such a date holds a great advantage for a Democratic president: it would make the Bush administration deal with the likely violent and damaging consequences of a withdrawal. Like Edwards, Senator Obama caveats troop pullback with the contradictory proposal for leaving an ‘over the horizon force’ to “protect American personnel and facilities, continue training Iraqi security forces, and root out al-Qaeda”.⁸ His recipe for preventing the collapse of Iraq is to “pressure the warring parties to find a lasting political solution” (as if the Bush administration had not been desperately and unsuccessfully attempting that for the past three years), and he wants the US to “refocus [its] attention on the broader Middle East”.⁹

^{7, 8 and 9} ‘Man of the Left’,
The Economist, July 19th 2007.

This puts Obama in closest alignment with the Democratic base, and is consistent with his votes against the war while in Congress. But unless President Bush grants his successor the gift of pulling out all troops while still in office – or the Democrat-controlled Congress compels the president to do so – Obama would have no choice but to order the withdrawal himself. This would cause a mad rush for the exit in the first months of his presidency, and could be seen as a

catastrophic beginning. The friction between Senator Obama’s policy and its likely practical execution leaves him vulnerable to charges of foreign policy inexperience. The Clinton campaign is sure to pounce on that, and also to make the Bush parallel to damage Obama: the last time we elected someone this inexperienced was in 2000, and it had disastrous effects for the country.

Senator Clinton promises to end American engagement 60 days into her presidency, saying “if we in Congress don’t end this war before January 2009, as president, I will”.¹⁰ She has opposed the president’s surge strategy and voted to force troop withdrawals by March 2008. But her approach voluntarily incurs the same potential problem as Senator Obama: it would start her presidency with a major crisis precipitated by US withdrawal from Iraq.

¹⁰ ‘Clinton sees some troops staying in Iraq if she is elected’,
New York Times,
March 14th 2007.

While the timeline is problematic, the substance of the Clinton plan is more practical than that of either Edwards or Obama. It would probably be acceptable across party lines, and is the likeliest outcome irrespective of who inhabits the White House in March 2008. She acknowledges the need for a “remaining military as well as political mission” in Iraq, requiring a reduced but significant military force with the missions of fighting al Qaeda, deterring Iran, and protecting the Kurdish population. But it would no longer engage in Baghdad patrols or protect Iraqis from sectarian violence, even if the country descended into ethnic cleansing.¹¹ Senator Clinton promises to continue funding the Iraqi military while hedging that commitment by criticising its low morale and growing politicisation.

¹¹ Senator Hillary Clinton,
transcript of interview with Michael Gordon of the New York Times, March 15th 2007.

The Clinton plan is not without flaws. Why would the Iraqis tolerate a heavy US military presence if US soldiers do not protect Iraq from ethnic and religious violence? But it is still the most practical blueprint by the Democrats, and much more realistic than Senator

Obama's approach. Clinton's problem is not with grasping the reality of Iraq but with finding a solution around which the Democrats are likely to unite. The same elements which make her plan plausible may render it unacceptable to the left wing of her party.

Yet Clinton's difficulties are still smaller than those facing the Republicans. They stand to lose much more from Iraq, for two reasons: national security issues have more salience with Republican voters (including most of the military); and the Republican hopefuls continue to support the war.

Senator John McCain is most closely associated with Iraq. He was strident in his criticism of the president's prosecution of the war in its first two and a half years. But McCain also supported the president's surge strategy, and is now linked with its success or failure. Although an early frontrunner, Senator McCain failed to secure support from social conservatives and alienated his independent voter base by trying. His campaign is having difficulty raising money. Barring a strong showing in the early round of primaries he will be knocked out of the race.

Governor Romney and Rudy Giuliani have both claimed the 'we would have done it better' territory burnishing their managerial credentials and justifying their support for the war. They take a 'more in sorrow than in anger' approach to criticising the US president (with Romney

¹² Mary Snou, 'Romney faults administration for mistakes on Iraq', *CNN.com*, May 11th 2007.

¹³ Richard Perez-Pena, 'Giuliani's Iraq views may provide cover', *New York Times*, February 14th 2007.

the more overtly critical of the pair).¹² Giuliani supported the surge while acknowledging it may not succeed; he is effectively saying that even if the Iraq war fails, the US needs to keep fighting terrorists because they will keep on trying to attack America.¹³ Giuliani has the advantage of being seen as tough on terrorism because of his showing as mayor of New York during and after the September 11th attacks. Voters will probably rate him highly for his expertise on national security issues. They may also scrutinise his Iraq plans more leniently than those of other Republicans.

Whoever wins the election, Iraq is likely to dominate the new president's agenda, at least early on in the presidency. Those Europeans who expect more US engagement in, for example, the Balkans, are likely to find the new administration wanting. If a Republican wins, Europeans may also find – to the displeasure of many – that his Iraq policy is rather similar to that of George W Bush.

Climate change

Besides Iraq, the candidates have addressed only two other foreign policy issues: climate change and trade. In both cases, the difference lies between parties more than between candidates. In both cases, the candidates' views will matter little. In the case of climate change, states and businesses have taken the initiative, not the federal government. In the case of trade, Congress is likely to prevent significant future trade deals.

Climate change is gaining traction in American politics. Senators Clinton and Obama have signed up to a bill mandating emission cuts. Senator Edwards has staked out the most radical position. He wants an 80 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.¹⁴ Senator Fred Thompson, a late Republican entry into the race, represents the other pole of the climate debate. He has taken a hard-right line on the environment, mocking the science underlying the claims of climate change.¹⁵

¹⁴ 'Man of the Left', *The Economist*, July 19th 2007.

¹⁵ Fred Thompson, 'Plutonic warming', *Paul Harvey Show, ABC Radio Networks*, March 22nd 2007.

Significant emission cuts will require unpopular changes to ways of life, and even a Democrat-controlled Congress will be reluctant to pursue them. Federal action would nevertheless be beneficial. It would attract attention to the many successful state initiatives. As with health care, America's federal structure is slowly producing a patchwork of experimental solutions to climate change. For example, 27 states have enacted standards requiring utility companies to generate 15 per cent of their power by clean sources. These state-level initiatives enrich the

policy debate and provide scale models for eventual national regulatory practice. American businesses are also urging greener policies, spurred on, in no small part, by fear of EU regulation or penalties.

Trade

The Democratic candidates tend to be more protectionist than the Republicans. As on many issues, Senator Edwards has the

¹⁶ John Edwards, 'Smarter trade that puts workers first', <http://johnedwards.com/issues/trade/>.

¹⁷ 'Democratic presidential candidates focus on country's infrastructure needs at labour union debate', *International Herald Tribune*, August 7th 2007.

¹⁸ 'Romney backs trade to end Latin American poverty,' *USA Today*, July 28th 2007.

¹⁹ Rudolph Giuliani, 'Toward a realistic peace', *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2007.

most radical stance, claiming that "[US] trade policy has been bad for Americans".¹⁶ But even the most pro-trade among the Democrats, Senator Clinton, argues that the North American free trade agreement needs to be revised to protect American jobs.¹⁷ By contrast, Republican candidates argue that trade creates new jobs for Americans. Mitt Romney has suggested that deeper trade ties can be a way of lifting parts of Latin America out of poverty.¹⁸ Mayor Giuliani said that "ever more open trade throughout the world is essential" and argues that it should supplant aid in development policy.¹⁹

Irrespective of the outcome of elections, the US will be less active in negotiating and enacting trade deals. A Republican president, even if pro-trade, will be badly hampered if – as is likely – Congress does not renew his authority to negotiate international trade agreements. A Democratic president may actively seek to curtail trade by resisting new agreements and re-negotiating existing deals.

4 Foreign policy in a new administration: areas of agreement

The real story of these US elections is the absence of genuine foreign policy differences between the presidential candidates. The candidates are largely in agreement on the major problems of the day. They all believe that we live in a more dangerous world than ever before; that homeland security is paramount; that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism are the greatest threats to the US; that unilateralism is acceptable and may be necessary; that military force plays a great role in the fight against terrorism; that the US needs to spend more on defence; that it must reduce its dependence on foreign oil; and that its European allies, by and large, do not do enough for global security. Their specific proposals vary slightly in emphasis, but they are not dissimilar. Nor are they substantially different from George W Bush's policies.

Domestic safety

All candidates want to improve homeland security through tighter border controls, more screening of people coming to the US, and more resources for port and transportation security. Despite six years without a successful terrorist attack in the US, the American people do not yet consider themselves safe enough – or, so at least the candidates believe. The candidates are certainly right that Americans want continuing reassurance that their domestic space is safe. And people in the US hold the federal government accountable for ensuring that safety.

Threats

Every candidate considers terrorism the major threat to the US. Specific threats on which all agree are: weapons of mass destruction, terrorists, rogue countries supporting terrorism, rising powers, and weak states. This is also the Bush administration's priority list. The

²⁰ John Edwards, 'A new strategy against terrorism', <http://johnedwards.com/issues/terrorism>. Only slight variances are Senator Obama's inclusion of environmental damage and Senator Edwards' effort to link poverty (also his domestic policy priority) to terrorism.²⁰

The sense of insecurity will continue to dominate US politics. Even Senator Obama likes to repeat the Bush administration's mistaken assertion that "this century's threats are at least as

²¹ Barak Obama, 'Renewing American leadership', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007. dangerous and in some ways more complex than those we have confronted in the past".²¹ This would come as a surprise

to John Adams attempting to equip and pay Washington's army, or to the Eisenhower team that faced an Armageddon of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the hands of an implacably hostile Soviet Union.

Pre-emption and unilateralism

Not only do the candidates agree on the main threats, but they also compete to sound the most hawkish in responding to those threats.

Senator Obama may have opposed the war in Iraq, but he sounds

²² Barak Obama, 'Renewing American leadership', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007. indistinguishable from President Bush when he promises to "use force, unilaterally if necessary, to protect the American people or [US] vital interests whenever [they] are attacked or imminently threatened".

²³ Jeff Zeleny and Steven Greenhouse, 'War on terror takes focus at Democratic debate', *New York Times*, August 8th 2007.

Obama also said that "there must be no safe haven for those who plot to kill Americans",²² and he vowed to send US forces into Pakistan without its government's approval if necessary to root out terrorists.²³ Even Senator Edwards wants the US to

"stay on the offensive against terrorism". He, along with most presidential candidates, merely argues for conducting the war on terror more effectively.

No major American politician believes it is possible to win elections without promising to vigorously prosecute terrorists and states sheltering terrorists. The campaigns consider tough national security credentials as a *sine qua non* for holding high office. The next US president will be expected to act pre-emptively, unilaterally, and with military force.

The US military

The presidential candidates are competing to promise the greatest increase in the size of the US military: Obama would add 65,000 soldiers and 27,000 marines; Romney 100,000 additional troops; and Giuliani at least 10 additional army brigades (30-50,000 troops). Both Romney and Obama also believe that the \$534 billion the Bush administration is spending this year on defence is inadequate. Obama recommends adding a whopping \$40 billion to the military budget, which would nearly equal the combined spending of the rest of the world.²⁴ Even John Edwards argues for "rebuilding from the Bush years".²⁴ *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 'SIPRI Yearbook 2007', 2007.*

All this suggests that the next US president will rely on military power as much as George W Bush. Most candidates also advocate that the US government create non-combat units for stability operations. These are not seen as alternatives to the use of military force; they are meant to work alongside combat units and specialise in rebuilding governments and infrastructure. Edwards advocates a "Marshall corps" of 10,000 civilians to contribute to nation-building. Giuliani has proposed creating a new military-civilian organisation: a 'stabilisation and reconstruction corps' staffed by specially trained military and civilian reservists.²⁵ *Rudolph Giuliani, 'Toward a realistic peace', Foreign Affairs, September/October 2007.*

²⁶ Romney's ideas dovetail with the bipartisan Project on National Security Reform, that aspires to persuade Congress to revise the 1947 National Security Act to better integrate government activities. See <http://www.pnsr.org/>.

Its job would be to assist the military in nation-building. Romney says that the US has all the right tools but that it needs to improve co-ordination between government agencies and use non-military means more intensively.²⁶

Reducing energy dependence

All candidates want to reduce American dependence on foreign oil.

Romney has proposed a 'Manhattan project' to develop alternative sources of energy. Giuliani writes about developing new technologies and making better use of resources under US control (primarily coal) instead of imported oil and gas.²⁷

Edwards argues for training 150,000 Americans a year to work in 'green collar' jobs that would be created by switching away from foreign oil and gas. Senator Clinton says she would halve US

²⁷ Rudolph Giuliani, 'Leading America toward energy independence', *Real Clear Politics*, July 26th 2007.

²⁸ Dan Balz, 'Clinton lays out energy plan', *Washington Post*, May 24th 2006.

oil imports by 2025, using a combination of tax incentives, a tax on profits of oil companies and new funds for alternative energy research.²⁸

Unlike in Europe, the US electoral discourse on energy is largely separated from the environment. Only Senator Edwards has called for a new climate change treaty; other candidates tend to view oil dependence as a national security and economic problem. New sources of energy would lessen America's reliance on Saudi Arabia or Venezuela – countries with increasingly difficult relations with the US. The search for new energy sources, via research funding and technological breakthroughs, also holds the promise of creating new jobs. Environment itself has been a part of the debate – both Clinton and Obama have said they want cuts in US emissions – but the environment is overshadowed by national security concerns.

Palestine

On the Middle East, too, the candidates depart little from the Bush administration. Senator Obama would help Israelis to identify and strengthen those partners who are truly committed to peace, while isolating those who seek conflict and instability, and also reinvigorate American diplomacy. That is essentially the current US approach, rephrased: isolating Hamas and strengthening President Mahmoud Abbas.

Hillary Clinton and John Edwards have said almost nothing on the Middle East. Mitt Romney would make cosmetic changes to US policy; he argues for expanding economic opportunities for Palestinians through trade and special industrial zones.²⁹ The only candidate substantively straying from current US policy is Rudy Giuliani, who strikes a hard pro-Israeli line. He says that Palestinian statehood is not a priority, while governance is. Giuliani argues that Palestinians must earn international support for statehood by demonstrating a capacity for governance, which, he says, they have failed to do so far.³⁰

²⁹ Mitt Romney, 'Rising to a new generation of global challenges', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007.

³⁰ Fred Attewill and agencies, 'Palestinian state would endanger US, warns Giuliani', *Guardian Unlimited*, August 15th 2007.

There is little reason to believe a new American administration will bring fresh ideas or display a greater desire to make the Palestinian issue a priority in US foreign policy. This suggests that the Middle East peace process is likely to remain a problem for transatlantic relations. Europeans will expect greater effort and new approaches, but the US is not likely to produce either.

Missile defences

Giuliani and Romney have come out strongly in support of expanding the missile defence system. The Democratic candidates have made no statements to date. The Democrats in Congress did vote in June 2007 to cut funding for the planned US missile

defence site in Poland, but this may not be indicative of Clinton's or Obama's stance. No serious candidate will want to be caught opposing a system that most Americans believe makes the US safer against a growing threat from Iran and other countries. And if the missile defence sites in the Czech Republic and Poland are under construction by 2008, as is likely, reversing the programme would carry even higher domestic political costs. Americans have a low tolerance of risk, and see missile defences as an inherently virtuous concept.

A new administration of either stripe might be more skilful than President Bush at 'multilateralising' missile defence. The US will always insist on retaining the right and the means to control the system independently of anyone else. But it should be possible to give the allies access to the controls without jeopardising the US chain of command. There are precedents for this. NATO's integrated military command has always had an American-only parallel in the US-European command, and for exactly this same reason: from NATO's inception the US asserted the need to act unilaterally if the European allies chose not to act, or could not decide in a timely manner.

A new administration might also meet Moscow's demands halfway by including the Russian radar in Gabala, Azerbaijan, in the US missile defence system, as President Putin proposed in the summer of 2007. If so, it would not replace but complement the Czech radar (and that is certain to continue to rile the Kremlin). Also, a Russian presence in the missile defence control room remains a tricky political issue. Russia will have to reassure Americans that it is not selling or giving critical information about structures and procedures to the very states and groups against which the systems are designed.

5 Dogs that aren't barking

Three issues central to Europe's foreign policy discourse have received virtually no attention from American presidential candidates: Iran, Russia, and the European Union itself. All three are very likely to be forced onto the next president's agenda and to shape the transatlantic relationship. Should it go nuclear – or should it come so close that it triggers a Westemilitary intervention – Iran may well eclipse all other issues on the president's desk. But in all three cases, the subjects have been subsumed into broader discussions rather than being dealt with as topics in themselves.

Iran

Iran is mostly discussed in the context of the failure to prevent WMD proliferation and the UN's incapacity to protect international peace and security. The Democratic candidates argue over whether to set preconditions for talks with Iran. Giuliani favours negotiations in the style of Ronald Reagan at Reykjavik (walking out if there is no progress). Again, these views differ little from the Bush administration's course. It is also highly unlikely that the campaigns will produce any fresh insights on Iran. There are no good options for dealing with the country's nuclear programme, so the candidates will avoid the subject for as long as possible.

Russia

Russia has essentially fallen off the American geopolitical map. The candidates view Russia as commercially predatory as well as domestically and internationally authoritarian. No candidate argues for a fresh start in US-Russia relations or for building a positive partnership. It seems neither possible nor politically attractive.

Only Obama draws attention to the risk posed by Russian nuclear weapons, and has policy proposals designed to address it. He said that “America must lead a global effort to secure all nuclear weapons and material at vulnerable sites within four years – the

³¹ Barak Obama, ‘Renewing American leadership’, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007.

most effective way to prevent terrorists from acquiring a bomb”.³¹ But he, like all other candidates, also vows to frankly criticise Russia’s behaviour. Obama does not explain how to interest Russia in fighting nuclear proliferation while at the same time criticising its policies.

Unlike in Europe, Russia’s positive contribution to managing the Iranian nuclear programme receives no mention in the US. The same holds true for its missile defence proposals. While parts of Europe view Russia’s proposals as useful – and other parts as malicious – the low priority accorded to Russia in the US debate means that presidential candidates have not been drawn out on the subject.

Expectations of Europe

The EU has not yet featured in presidential debates. It may be America’s key partner in setting global trade rules, but for now the EU is discussed as neither a trade villain nor as an economic competitor. This is all the more surprising given the prominence of trade in the debates so far.

The EU has earned a few passing references in discussions of security, but these offer few clues to the candidates’ thinking. Giuliani argues for the US to work with European allies both

³² ‘The coming attack on Obama’, *Passport*, April 27th 2007, <http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/node/4576>.

individually and collectively; Obama listed “the EU as a whole” among major US allies, but attaches no policy prescriptions to that description.³²

While the European Union as such has not been prominent in the early presidential campaigning, Europe most certainly has. This

is not necessarily good news. All of the presidential campaigns are questioning whether Europe is doing enough to combat common problems.

Giuliani, Romney, Edwards and Obama want more from America’s allies. Obama promises to “rally our NATO allies to contribute more troops to collective security operations and to invest more in reconstruction and stabilisation capabilities”.³³ Romney asserts that we need “a renewed sense of service and shared sacrifice among Americans and our allies around the world”.³⁴

³³ ‘The coming attack on Obama’, *Passport*, April 27th 2007.

³⁴ Mitt Romney, ‘Rising to a new generation of global challenges’, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007.

Both the major Republican candidates also call for strengthening non-European relationships. Giuliani would expand NATO to countries that share US concerns about terrorism, irrespective of their geographic location. He has also written that relationships in Asia should be “given at least as much attention as Europe”.³⁵ Romney advocates “dramatic changes to Cold War institutions and approaches” and commits to effective collaboration with newly emerging powers, including Brazil, India, Nigeria and South Africa.

³⁵ Rudolph Giuliani, ‘Toward a realistic peace’, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2007.

This should be a warning to Europeans. Across the political spectrum, America’s major politicians believe Europe is contributing too little and the US doing too much to secure common objectives. This will not go down well in many quarters of Europe. Exclusion from Operation Enduring Freedom (the US operation against the Taliban) – even after invocation of NATO’s mutual defence clause – stung many European Atlanticists. They felt that the US administration fatally undermined the alliance by not calling on NATO’s resources when an ally came under attack – which is precisely what the organisation was set up to do. The reasoning put forth by American defence experts – that Europeans had too little to contribute militarily to make their participation worthwhile – only added to the injury. The US was also deaf to European counsel about

the complexity of Iraq and the potential chaos following regime change in Baghdad, and it has argued with its allies over how aggressively to fight (as opposed to nation build) in Afghanistan. All this has built an understandable sense among Europeans that they have justifiably opted out of missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

But the next US president is not likely to sweeten the terms on which America works with its allies. It is true that all candidates dress up their foreign policies in more appealing verbiage than the Bush administration: Obama advocates “common security for our common humanity,” whereas Romney argues for “new thinking on foreign policy and an overarching strategy that can unite the United States and its allies”. They offer very co-operative rhetoric, seemingly consistent with the EU’s preference for effective multilateralism. But their administrations are unlikely to produce policies to Europe’s liking. American foreign policy will remain focused on aggressively fighting terrorism, protecting the US homeland, pre-empting threats, unilaterally advancing American interests, using military force, developing energy independence, supporting Israel in Palestine and deploying missile defences. And while the US political elites concede that Europeans may have a point in arguing for a better division of the military burden (“if we’re not in for the take-off, you can’t expect us to be in for the landing”) the new US administration will not be moved from those policies.

In fact, it is possible that the next US president could tell Europeans that he or she did not support the war in Iraq and that the US will withdraw its forces, leaving the region – and its European neighbourhood – to fend for itself. Given Middle Eastern attitudes to the US, the president could call on Europeans rather than Americans to provide troops to ring Iraq’s borders in order to keep other regional powers from carving the country into pieces. Just as likely, the next president may tell Europeans that the US military is depleted from Iraq and Afghanistan, and that EU forces should deal with Kosovo on their own.

Any new administration will be able to argue that it did not create the current problems in Iraq. Even Republican presidential aspirants, who all supported the war, are no less likely than the Democrats to come across the Atlantic with a list of demands: forces for Iraq stabilisation, fresh troops for the NATO mission in Afghanistan, or joint training with countries in the forefront of battling terrorism (such as Egypt, Indonesia and Nigeria). They may ask EU member-states to send more soldiers on UN missions, and to undertake more operations under the EU banner.

Perhaps most importantly, a new administration of either political stripe will take considerable persuading that the US is – to use Madeleine Albright’s arrogant-sounding term – the ‘indispensable nation’. It is not at all clear to Americans why Europeans – as individual nations or collectively as a Union – cannot use their own exceptionally capable militaries to threaten attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, coerce the Serbs to accept the independence of Kosovo, or help the African Union put an end to the violence in Darfur.

Europe does not give itself adequate credit for its strength. The EU includes at least eight of the world’s best militaries. Taken in combination, the EU would not be defeated in war by any country or coalition that did not include the United States. Its military power is undeniable; whether it is willing to use it more actively is a question that is likely to be tested by the next US administration.

6 The lessons of Iraq

Irrespective of who becomes the next US president, America's war in Iraq will come to an end, possibly early in the next administration. Even among the Republican voters, 63 per cent now favour a timeline for pulling out US forces.³⁶ The US debate is already shifting to discussing the lessons learned. American political elites are likely to draw four conclusions from the failure in Iraq: the US cannot change other states, 'effective multilateralism' does not work, European allies have become less important, and military force cannot achieve sophisticated political effects. Each of these poses difficulties for transatlantic relations.

³⁶ Margaret Talev, 'More GOP voters calling for Iraq timeline', *Miami Herald*, June 28th 2007.

The neo-conservative idea that the US has an ethical responsibility to remove antithetical regimes is damaged beyond salvation. Americans are likely to recall belatedly that the US has failed to bring about regime change in Cuba for 48 years, despite having far greater influence there than in practically any other country in the world. The US is learning to live with an unsatisfactory status quo. This will bring it in line with most European governments. But it may be bad news for the international order. It may well create a problem of another sort: destructive states and groups could make advances through intimidation, unchecked by American intervention.

The US and Europe will agree that the key to managing security threats lies in building the capacity for better governance in problem countries. Both sides will seek to do so through foreign assistance. But the US will lack confidence in the ability of failed states to produce effective governance. It has spent \$19 billion on training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, to little effect. The US will now lay the blame for the failure of the intervention in Iraq at the

feet of Iraqi politicians. In fact, the Iraq Survey Group report and Congressional troop reduction plans are both predicated on the assumption that the US cannot succeed because Iraqis are failing. The likely – and ironic – end result of the Iraq war is that the traditional foreign policy outlooks of Europe and the United States are likely to be reversed. Europeans have usually been sceptical of the ability to successfully change governments and developments abroad. But after Iraq, it is the usually confident Americans who will find themselves less optimistic and hopeful about positive change than the Europeans. So damaging is the shadow which Iraq has cast over US foreign policy.

The Europeans and Americans seem certain to disagree on how to deal with governments that threaten our security. The US will probably remain much more willing to take punitive action against such states, whether or not they appear to have control over their national territories. But after Iraq, the US is also dramatically less likely to use ground troops. The future crises will therefore bring back the Kosovo debate (itself heavily influenced by US casualties in Somalia), in which the US sought to win the war through air power alone. Following Iraq, the US will want to ‘do its part’ with long-distance precision strikes, and it will expect Europeans to send in ground forces to deal with the aftermath. American forces are very unlikely to be employed for peacekeeping or nation-building any time soon.

Iraq will also probably generate different transatlantic conclusions on the benefits of multilateral diplomacy. The prevailing European attitude blames the US for undervaluing the UN and avoiding ‘real’ multilateralism, which, in turn, has led to disappointingly small military contributions from most EU countries (with a few notable exceptions). From the US perspective, its approach – make your case internationally, seek a UN mandate, go with UN blessing where possible, assemble a coalition of the willing where not – has not been repudiated. To the US, the UN is a desirable, but not an essential validator. The mission will continue to define the coalition (even if

the next administration puts it less bluntly). Iraq has strengthened the American view that international institutions are not effective in managing the threats Americans are concerned about. A new administration will probably attempt to reform the major institutions so that they perform more to America’s needs and liking. For example, it may want NATO to focus more on producing battle-ready troops, and it will probably seek to make the UN less obstructionist when deliberating on the use of force.

In a way that is inaccurate but rings true emotionally, the US feels alone in bearing the burden of Iraq. Americans gloss over the enormous political price Prime Minister Blair paid for Britain’s participation, the fact that nearly every government that sent troops to Iraq has been voted out of power, and that a destabilised Iraq has had a titanic effect on Turkey and other neighbours. American solipsism on the subject is likely to increase – 140,000 US troops will remain in Iraq for at least another 15 months whereas other countries may withdraw forces earlier. When others tell Americans how much they have lost in Iraq and how disappointed they are in American leadership, Americans will reply bitterly that the US has risked and lost much more. Europeans and Americans will need to find a way to talk about common sacrifices in terms that resonate with both sides and that do not belittle the continuing US involvement.

Europeans will also need to find ways of reminding the US of their comparative value as allies. It will not be enough to highlight potential contributions; that will only remind the US of all that Europe could have but failed to contribute to the Iraq war. There is a sense among Americans now that the transatlantic relationship was successful when focused on Europe’s problems, but never very good at building common approaches to non-European challenges, be they Suez or Vietnam or halting the spread of Communism in Central America. Americans are likely to enter into one of their periodic fits of searching for better allies than the Europeans. The US will likely explore potential relationships with China, India,

Japan and other countries that dangle the prospect of closer perspectives and more robust contributions. It is not surprising that American Atlanticists are driving the idea of a ‘concert of democracies’, which emphasises values and the need to build agreement on goals and strategy. They are seeking to forestall a ‘concert of committed’ in which the United States partners with countries willing to commit troops to operations because they are already in agreement about goals and strategy. That would leave the Europeans with a greatly diminished role and much less ability to influence American politics.

Americans are likely to feel quite defensive about the performance of the US military in Iraq, too. They believe their country comes out of Iraq with its toughest, most tactically proficient, and best-equipped military in at least a generation. They will not be prepared to hear that the technologically sophisticated US weaponry is unsuited for the low-tech requirements of peacekeeping and nation-building. Others may feel that the US army and marine corps should have paid more attention to training for stability operations, which would have prepared them better for the challenges of Baghdad and the Sunni triangle. The American military will retort, with justification, that it performed brilliantly in the initial combat operations, and that it adapted well to the changing demands of the battle. It will complain about the lack of support from civilian counterparts in the political, economic and other essential sectors. Unlike in almost every European country, the US military has broad public support and important political salience, so its views are likely to define the debate.

Moreover, whereas others may consider Abu Ghraib the defining image of the American military in this war, Americans are likely to be impressed by their military’s restraint under fire. They will question whether any other military, exposed to such a hostile environment for so long, could match the behaviour of American forces. The US army continues to successfully recruit by persuading parents that the

³⁷ See <http://www.goarmy.com/> military service instills the right values in youth.³⁷ The US military remains the most

respected institution in American society, with 69 per cent of the American public showing a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in it. By contrast, 34 per cent express that much confidence in the Supreme Court, and only 14 per cent in Congress.³⁸ *Frank Newport, ‘Americans’ confidence in Congress at all-time low’, Gallup Poll, June 21st 2007.*

Inside the US government, the war in Iraq will strengthen the weight of the American military in the policy process. Its top brass differed on the plans for Iraq – while General Tommy Franks of the US Central Command developed the plan, Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki had major concerns. However, few army or marine corps generals were willing to support him. In the end, the military failed to effectively relay its concerns to civilian leadership. There is now a strong consensus that the military needs to be less deferential. In the future, the uniformed leadership may be more willing to quietly coach Congress and journalists on the difficult questions to pose to the administration. The top soldiers will be more likely to withhold support for presidential initiatives that put soldiers in harm’s way, unless they come with mutually-reinforcing political and economic strategies.

We are also likely to see the pendulum swing back in favour of the ‘Powell doctrine’. The concept, which Colin Powell articulated while serving as chairman of the chiefs of staff, takes a limited view of the power of military force to achieve political change. It requires the civilian leadership to commit to a bargain in which they deploy force as a last resort, take responsibility for producing public support, and leave the military wide latitude in designing operations.

All this, too, will be cause for transatlantic friction. Europeans will draw the opposite conclusion, wanting small doses of military force subordinated to political oversight. The US military will have even wider latitude in setting the terms for using force. It is likely to escape blame for US failings in Iraq, and its role in the political life may in fact be strengthened.

7 Is Europe a winnable constituency?

Americans may be beginning to question the wisdom of concentrating so much effort on policy co-ordination with European governments and the EU. This has not delivered a Doha trade round agreement, nor as much help as was needed in Iraq or Afghanistan. The (belated) US overtures to Europe in the second Bush term did not soften European public attitudes to America. The US is still fumbling to find ways to solve new problems, and other countries seem of little help. The US is tired of working so hard to so little effect. A new presidential administration is certain to consider itself free from blame for the Bush administration's bungles. The new president will probably ignore that it was the underlying policies as much as poor execution that produced disagreements and a lack of commitment in Europe. He or she will be surprised and disappointed to find Europeans reluctant to commit to a more equitable (to American eyes) sharing of the burden.

The Americans are thoroughly discouraged to find that Russia can garner as much if not more public support in Europe, despite using energy to blackmail former Soviet and Warsaw pact states. The Europeans' preferences raise questions about the basic soundness of the transatlantic relationship. Should Europe find itself in crisis because Russia cuts energy supplies, the US would be sorely tempted to let the consequences be felt. Europeans would likely return the favour if and when Venezuela does the same to California's oil supply. The lack of sympathy for each others' choices is striking. We must look for ways to redress it.

Chancellor Merkel has shown a possible way forward. She stepped into the transatlantic void after Britain lost confidence in its ability

to steer the transatlantic discourse. Merkel turned down the temperature on transatlantic disputes, and, just as importantly, she was harder on Russia than on the US. In the first half of 2007, in her role as president of both the EU and G-8, she expended enormous effort in building practical compromises and corraling the necessary support. She consulted extensively with, but did not rely too heavily on, the US to produce results. One could almost feel Americans relax to find a head of state capable of leading Europe. Nicolas Sarkozy's election in France now gives her a natural ally (assuming they do not fall out over economic issues). Together they may have the means to rebuild public trust in the EU and move it past the EU constitutional dilemma. This would make European states and the EU more valuable allies for the US.

Improved lower-key co-operation on smaller issues may be enough to forestall large – and inevitably fruitless – demands from the other side of the Atlantic after the new president takes office. Small-scale progress could restore more compassion and generosity to the continual dialogue among close allies, and set more realistic expectations for American policies and European contributions.

★



- ★ **How to make EU emissions trading a success**
Pamphlet by Simon Tilford (October 2007)
- ★ **What Europeans think about Turkey and why**
Essay by Katinka Barysch (September 2007)
- ★ **Russia, realism and EU unity**
Policy brief by Katinka Barysch (July 2007)
- ★ **European choices for Gordon Brown**
Pamphlet by Charles Grant, Hugo Brady, Simon Tilford and Aurore Wanlin (July 2007)
- ★ **EU business and Turkish accession**
Essay by Katinka Barysch and Rainer Hermann (June 2007)
- ★ **Serbia's European choice**
Policy brief by David Gowan (June 2007)
- ★ **Britain and Europe: A City minister's perspective**
Essay by Ed Balls MP (May 2007)
- ★ **Why treaty change matters for business and Britain**
Policy brief by Hugo Brady and Charles Grant (May 2007)
- ★ **What future for EU development policy?**
Working paper by Aurore Wanlin (May 2007)
- ★ **The EU should not ignore the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation**
Policy brief by Oksana Antonenko (May 2007)
- ★ **The EU and the fight against organised crime**
Working paper by Hugo Brady (April 2007)
- ★ **The Lisbon scorecard VII: Will globalisation leave Europe stranded?**
Pamphlet by Katinka Barysch, Simon Tilford and Aurore Wanlin (February 2007)
- ★ **Divided world: The struggle for primacy in 2020**
Essay by Mark Leonard (January 2007)
- ★ **Turkish business and EU accession**
Essay by Sinan Ülgen (December 2006)
- ★ **The EU and Russia: From principle to pragmatism**
Policy brief by Katinka Barysch (November 2006)



The US elections and Europe

The coming crisis of high expectations

Kori Schake

The election of a new US president in 2008 offers an opportunity to repair US-European relations. But, as Kori Schake argues in this essay, both sides must guard against high expectations. Europe will expect a post-Bush US to take a multilateral approach to foreign policy. However, the US is likely to continue acting as an exceptional power, sometimes unbound by international law. Similarly, the new US administration may expect the EU to make a bigger contribution to sorting out the world's trouble spots. But it will be disappointed: most Europeans believe that the Iraq war has vindicated their soft-power approach and they are not going to spend more on defence. Transatlantic relations will remain rocky.

Kori Schake is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Distinguished Chair of International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy at West Point. She served on the National Security Council during President George W Bush's first term.

ISBN 978 1 901229 77 6 ★ £8

G|M|F The German Marshall Fund
of the United States
STRENGTHENING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION